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OFFICIA  AND CASUISTRY: SOM E EPISODES 
Terence IRWIN 
University of Oxford 
RÉSUMÉ. Les stoïciens ont joué un rôle essentiel dans le développement de la 
casuistique. Selon eux, une conduite morale réfléchie suppose une théorie morale, 
et ils s’efforcent d’appliquer la théorie morale à l’analyse de cas particuliers. Nous 
pouvons saisir l’importance de leur contribution en considérant la façon dont elle 
sous-tend le système de casuistique issu de la philosophie morale scolastique qui 
apparaît au XVIe siècle. Ma présentation des différentes étapes de l’histoire de la ca-
suistique comporte de nombreuses lacunes, à la fois parce que j’ai négligé plusieurs 
sources importantes et parce que j’ai laissé de côté des aspects significatifs de celles 
que j’examine. Peut-être cependant, réduite comme elle l’est à l’essentiel, l’esquisse 
que je présente aidera-t-elle à mettre en lumière l’importance des stoïciens. 
SUMMARY. The Stoics hold a central place in the development of systematic 
casuistry. They insist that practical moral reasoning depends on moral theory, and 
they try to use moral theory to inform moral reasoning about particular cases. We can 
grasp the significance of their contribution if we see how it underlies the more 
elaborate system of casuistry that emerges in the sixteenth century from Scholastic 
moral philosophy. My survey of these different stages in the history of casuistry will 
leave many gaps, both because I have omitted many relevant sources and because I 
have passed over many relevant aspects of the sources that I discuss. But perhaps the 




1.  Introduction 
The Stoics inherit a tradition of casuistry in moral reasoning. We are 
not well informed about all of this tradition, but we can identify some 
contributions to it. As far as we can tell, the Stoics hold a central place in 
the development of systematic casuistry. They insist that practical moral 
reasoning depends on moral theory, and they try to use moral theory to 
inform moral reasoning about particular cases. We can grasp the signifi-
cance of their contribution if we see how it underlies the more elaborate 
system of casuistry that emerges in the sixteenth century from Scholastic 
moral philosophy. My survey of these different stages in the history of casu-
istry will leave many gaps, both because I have omitted many relevant sour-
ces and because I have passed over many relevant aspects of the sources that 
I discuss1. But perhaps the starkness of the outline that I offer will help to 
highlight the role of the Stoics. 
The casuistical aspect of moral thinking allows us to explore one aspect 
of ancient moral philosophy. We may begin with a contrast that Julia 
Annas draws between ancient and modern theories: 
Ancient theories assume that the moral agent internalizes and applies the 
moral theory to produce the correct answers to hard cases; but the answers 
themselves are not part of the theory. Nor are they produced by the theory 
in the sense that applying the theory to a simple description of a hard case 
will automatically generate a correct answer. Thus for ancient theorists it is 
true that there is not much to be said in general about hard cases. Modern 
theorists often see it as a demand that they be able to generate answers to 
hard cases in a comparatively simple way; and to this extent ancient ethics 
fails to meet modern demands on casuistry2. 
Annas returns to these questions with a more complicated contrast 
between ancient and modern theories: 
 
1. Some of the gaps are filled by the historical treatments of casuistry in Kirk 1927, and 
Jonsen and Toulmin 1988. 
2. Annas 1993, 6-7. I have discussed this passage in Irwin 1994. 
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Indeed ethical theories are not seen [sc. by the ancients] primarily as 
mechanisms for answering ethical questions at all… although the agent who 
has absorbed an ethical theory will thereby be provided with means to solve 
the problems that confront him, there is no expectation that ethical theory 
will provide a decision procedure for solving hard cases which would lack a 
solution without it. … We do in fact have lists of textbook problem cases 
from the Stoics, together with their answers to them. And it is not hard to 
find passages like that in which Cicero comments on importance of rules 
and principles in moral philosophy, because of the need to determine one’s 
duty in all areas of one’s life. But the theory is not driven, or structured by 
this demand; the energy, and the basic arguments, are devoted to producing 
a convincing account of our final end3. 
In this paper I am not trying to disagree with Annas; on the contrary, 
much of what I will say confirms her claim about what is primary in anc-
ient ethical theory. Nor do I mean to suggest that ancient ethical theories 
are meant to provide a ‘decision procedure’, if that refers to an effective 
method that can be used, without any further moral judgment, to resolve 
all hard cases. My aim is to emphasize a point that Annas neither denies 
nor affirms. Some ancient moral theories are intended to provide principles 
that are necessary for the correct response to moral perplexities. They claim 
to succeed in this task precisely because they are not intended primarily as 
mechanisms for resolving practical problems; for the right way of resolving 
practical problems depends on the broader viewpoint of a theory that is not 
devised simply to resolve these problems. 
This claim about moral theory and practical problems is simply a para-
phrase of Seneca. But before we come to Seneca, it will be useful to men-
tion some parts of the tradition that precedes him. 
2 .  Plato  and Simonides  
Plato’s Republic is intended to answer a practical question that can arise 
in both easy and hard cases: when should I keep promises? At any rate, he 
introduces this question near the beginning of Book I. Plato expresses two 
common and reasonable assumptions about the content of moral virtues: 
(1) They commit us to general principles requiring specific actions in speci-
fic circumstances. (2) Any informative and applicable generalizations that 
we can find seem to have exceptions. Plato expresses these two thoughts in 
one of Socrates’ early questions about justice. Socrates asks whether justice 
is speaking the truth and giving back what one has borrowed, and he sug-
gests that it is not, because it is sometimes not just to give back what one 
 
3. Annas 1993, 443. 
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has borrowed – if, e.g., we have borrowed a friend’s sword and he wants it 
back to kill himself when he is not in his right mind4. 
If we concentrate on examples of this sort, we may be inclined to reject 
our first assumption, and so to deny that the virtues commit us to general 
principles; for we may suppose that every principle we put forward can be 
refuted by counter-examples. But Socrates does not endorse this reaction. 
For immediately he turns to Simonides’ account of justice as rendering 
what is due to each person5. Socrates argues that this account needs to be 
clarified, but he does not reject it; it is not subject to exceptions, once it is 
properly understood. It constitutes a basic element in the argument about 
justice in the Republic as a whole. 
Plato does not present the question about paying debts as a case of con-
science. But we easily present it in this light. Plato’s answer to the question 
such as ‘Should I return this sword that I have promised to return?’ and the 
more general question ‘Should I keep my promises?’ is No. But his answer 
to the question ‘Should I render what is due to each person?’ is Yes. He 
believes that some ethical generalizations have exceptions,  but others apply 
without exception. These examples may serve to illustrate the difference 
between a principle and a rule of justice.6 Whereas rules of justice may have 
exceptions, the exceptions are explicable by reference to the principles of 
justice, which have no exceptions. In Socrates' example about returning the 
sword, we do not find that we ought not to return the sword by appeal to 
some consideration external to justice. Socrates does not argue, for inst-
ance, that it would be just but not benevolent to return the sword. Prin-
ciples of justice itself show us why the rule of returning what we have bor-
rowed is inadequate. 
3 .  Aristotle  on rules  and exceptions:  equity  and fr iendship  
Aristotle recognizes a similar difference between generalizations that 
have exceptions and those that hold without exception, and he places 
principles of justice in the latter class. In his view, the virtue of justice 
requires more than rules that have exceptions. He explores the scope of 
justice in his discussion of ‘decency’ or ‘equity’ (epieikeia). At first sight, we 
seem to need equity in cases where too strict an adherence to justice seems 
to result in a bad outcome7. But Aristotle rejects this argument for finding 
exceptions to justice. He argues that equity is a correction of general rules 
of justice. His examples are provisions of the written law, which need to be 
 
4. Republic, 331c1-d3. 
5. 331e1-332b4. 
6. In speaking of principles and rules I follow Scanlon 1998, 199. 
7. Aristotle, EN 1137a31-b5. 
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modified in particular cases8. The correct modifications conflict with the 
written law, but not with the legislator; for they say what the legislator 
would have said if he had been present in this particular situation9. 
In this case Aristotle offers us less than Plato offers in Republic I; he 
does not state any principle corresponding to the Simonidean principle 
that explains why a rule of justice is inadequate. We might wonder, then, 
whether he believes Plato is mistaken to introduce a principle underlying 
the rule, and we might point to his remarks about the insufficiency of univ-
ersals to show that he does not believe in any such principle. But this would 
be an unwarranted inference from the discussion of equity10.  
In EN IX 2 and EE VII 11 Aristotle discusses questions about (inter 
alia) what one ought or ought not to do for one’s friends, and especially 
how far one ought to go in doing what they want. Ross aptly entitles this 
section ‘the casuistry of friendship’11. In the EN Aristotle recalls (1165a12-
14) his remarks in Books I and II that the character of discourse about 
ethical questions has to match the subject matter; in his view, the variety of 
situations, circumstances, and considerations makes it impossible to pro-
 
8. ‘The puzzle arises because the decent is just, but is not the legally just, but a rectifica-
tion of it. This is because all law is universal, but in some areas no universal rule can be 
correct; and so where a universal rule has to be made, but cannot be correct, the law chooses 
the <universal rule> that is usually <correct>, well aware of the error being made. And the 
law is no less correct on this account; for the source of the error is not the law or the 
legislator, but the nature of the object itself, since that is what the subject matter of actions 
is bound to be like. And so, whenever the law makes a universal rule, but in this particular 
case what happens violates the universal rule, on this point the legislator falls short, and has 
made an error by making an unqualified rule. Then it is correct to rectify the deficiency; this 
is what the legislator would have said himself if he had been present there, and what he 
would have prescribed, had he known, in his legislation.’ (EN 1137b5-24) 
9. This chapter on epieikeia is discussed by Horn 2006. 
10. I have discussed this aspect of Aristotle in Irwin 2000. 
11. ‘Here are some other questions that raise a puzzle. Must you give way in everything 
to your father, and obey him in everything? Or must you trust the doctor when he is sick, 
and should you vote for a military expert to be general? Similarly, should you do a service for 
your friend rather than for an excellent person, and return a favour to a benefactor rather 
than do a favour for a companion, if you cannot do both? Surely it is not easy to define all 
these matters exactly. For they include many differences of all sorts – in importance and 
unimportance, and in the fine and the necessary. Still, it is clear that not everything should 
be rendered to the same person, and usually we should return favours rather than do favours 
for our companions, just as we should return a loan to a creditor rather than lend to a 
companion. But presumably this is not always true. If, for instance, someone has ransomed 
you from pirates, should you ransom him in return, no matter who he is? Or if he does not 
need to be ransomed, but asks for his money back, should you return it, or should you ran-
som your father instead? Here it seems that you should ransom your father, rather than even 
yourself. As we have said, then, we should, generally speaking, return what we owe. But if 
making a gift outweighs by being finer or more necessary, we should incline to them.’ (EN 
1164b25-1165a4.) 
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vide completely exact statements about what one ought to do in specific 
cases (1164b27-30). The specific questions he discusses here are about 
what one ought to do for various types of friends, and in particular whether 
one ought without exception to follow the wishes or serve the interests of 
this or that type of friend – father, benefactor, virtuous companion, etc. 
Aristotle’s answer to this question is No. But he does not reject general 
principles. He accepts a Simonidean principle; our decisions about what we 
ought to do for our parents, or friends, or benefactors, in cases where they 
have conflicting claims on us, should fit what is due to each of them12. If 
one action exceeds (hyperteine(i), 1165a3) another in respect of the fine or 
the necessary, that is what we ought to do. He does not offer further details 
on what makes an action finer or more necessary. 
4 .  Theophrastus  on weighing goods  
Though Aristotle recognizes these casuistical questions about the dem-
ands of friendship, he does not explicitly discuss a question that Aulus Gel-
lius mentions as a standard question about friendship. Gellius gives us the 
question in Greek:  
So too many subsequent students of philosophy, as appears in their works, 
have inquired very carefully and very anxiously, to use their own language, 
εἰ δεῖ βοηθεῖν τῷ φιλῷ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ μέχρι ποσοῦ καὶ ποία. 
We may translate ‘whether one ought to help one’s friend contrary to 
the just, and up to how great <an injustice> and in what sorts of things’. 
The question recognizes that if we say we ought to help our friends contr-
ary to justice, we raise a further question about how far we ought to go in 
doing this13. According to Gellius, Theophrastus raised this question in the 
first book of his work on friendship14. 
 
12. ‘And since different things should be rendered to parents, brothers, companions and 
benefactors, we should accord to each what is proper and suitable. This is what actually 
appears to be done; for instance, kinsfolk are the people invited to a wedding, since they 
share the same family, and hence share in actions that concern it; and for the same reason it 
is thought that kinsfolk more than anyone must come to funerals. It seems that we must 
supply means of support to parents more than anyone. For we suppose that we owe them 
this, and that it is finer to supply those who are the causes of our being than to supply 
ourselves in this way. And we should accord honour to our parents, just as we should to the 
gods, but not every sort of honour; for we should not accord the same honour to a father as 
to a mother, nor accord to them the honour due to a wise person or a general. We should 
accord a father's honour to a father, and likewise a mother's to a mother.’ (EN 1165a14-27) 
13. Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae, I 3.9. 
14. On Theophrastus see Saunders 1998. According to Holford-Strevens 2003, 113, 
Gellius probably read this work of Theophrastus for himself, and did not simply rely on 
Favorinus or Plutarch. 
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Theophrastus’ question is relevant to Aristotle’s claim that we do not 
owe unconditional loyalty to our friends, because the fine and the necessary 
are the overriding considerations. Theophrastus asks whether it might not 
be finer and more necessary to help one’s friends even if we have to act un-
justly. Gellius quotes the argument that Theophrastus presents in reply to 
Aristotle’s claim about justice: 
On this point I append Theophrastus’ own words:  ‘It is not the case that if 
one thing is a more valuable sort of thing, every part whatever of this thing, 
compared with a complete amount of another thing, will be choiceworthy. 
For instance, it is not the case that if gold is more valuable than bronze, a 
quantity of gold compared with a quantity of bronze will seem more 
valuable; on the contrary, the amount and the size will carry some weight.’ 
(Gellius NA I 26.) 
He grants that considerations of justice outrank benefits to a single per-
son. Still, he observes, it does not follow that in every particular case the 
just action outranks a good turn for our friend. For it may be a small mat-
ter, as far as justice is concerned, and a large increase in personal benefit. A 
large amount of bronze is more valuable than a small amount of gold, if the 
relevant amounts are large and small enough. However valuable justice may 
be, it does not follow that a small infraction of justice always outweighs the 
value of an unjust benefit. 
Aristotle does not directly address Theophrastus’ argument on this 
point. Hence Theophrastus raises a legitimate question for Aristotle. He 
implies that Aristotle’s views do not provide an answer to the question 
about helping friends, and that in particular they do not justify a negative 
answer. 
5 .  Cicero  and Theophrastus  
In De Officiis III Cicero presents a firm answer to Theophrastus’ 
suggestion. 
Duties are most disturbed, however, in friendships, in which it is against 
duty not to do what one can correctly do, and to do what is not fair 
(aequum). But for all such cases we have a short and easy precept (praecep-
tum). Whatever things appear advantageous – honours, wealth, pleasures, 
and the other things of this kind – should never be placed before friend-
ships.  But a good man will do nothing for a friend’s sake either against the 
common weal or against his oath and promise, not even if he is a judge in a 
friend’s case.… For if everything were to be done that friends wanted, these 
would have to be counted not as friendships but as conspiracies. (Cic. Off. 
III 43-4.) 
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The summary statement ‘tribuere quod non sit aequum contra officium 
est’ gives a firm negative answer to Theophrastus. But it does not clearly 
address the specific question raised by Theophrastus, about a small breach 
of justice for a great benefit to one’s friend. 
Cicero’s general answer to questions of the sort that Theophrastus 
raises is that advantage on one side cannot outweigh rightness on the other 
side, because nothing can be expedient on the whole if it is not right. This 
answer, however, leaves many casuistical questions unsolved. For in many 
cases the parties do not claim that their proposed course of action is so 
advantageous that the advantage outweighs its moral wrongness, but that it 
is so advantageous that the advantage makes it right. Some of Cicero’s 
remarks suggest that we can settle whether an action is right without asking 
who gains or loses from it, and how much; but since gain and loss are rele-
vant to determining rightness, he cannot plausibly claim that rightness is 
fixed independently of gain and loss. 
This brings us back to Plato’s example. We may agree with the Simon-
idean principle, but we cannot apply it without reference to gain and loss. 
For if it justifies us in sometimes refusing to return deposits, it shows us 
that failure to return deposits is not always wrong, and that returning them 
is not always right. If your friend asks you to give his sword back when he is 
deranged and is threatening harm to himself and others, the loss that would 
result from his getting his sword back would be greater than the gain, and 
this balance of gain and loss helps to explain why you ought not to give him 
back his sword. Cicero agrees with Plato’s conclusions from this example 
(Off. III 95), but he does not make it clear that the balance of gains and 
losses is relevant to determining whether the action is right or wrong. 
In some other cases the comparative gains and losses are relevant to the 
rightness of the action, but in a different way. Cicero discusses a merchant 
who is selling corn at high prices in a time of scarcity, but knows that 
several other ships are on their way with more corn. The question is not 
whether he should act wrongly by concealing his knowledge and profiting 
from the ignorance of his customers. Cicero assumes that he is a wise and 
good man (sapientem et bonum virum fingimus, III 50) who would do 
whatever he thought right, and is asking himself whether it is wrong to 
conceal what he knows (qui celaturus Rhodios non sit, si id turpe iudicet, sed 
dubitet, an turpe non sit). This question was a debated topic between Dio-
genes and Antipater, whom Cicero reports. But neither of them suggests 
that it would be wrong for the merchant to say what he knows, or that he is 
required to conceal what he knows; the question is simply whether it is 
permissible. There is no doubt that the Rhodians lose and he gains, but it is 
not clear how this balance of loss and gain determines rightness. Even if the 
Rhodians lose more than the merchant gains, it does not follow that he is 
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obliged to say what he knows; the question is whether he is obliged to 
disadvantage himself for their benefit (III 53). 
We need to vary the case to make it actually wrong to say what one 
knows; Cicero introduces the variation by mentioning a seller who men-
tions all the faults in the goods he is selling. In this case he suggests it would 
actually be wrong not to do what is expedient (ut id quod utile videtur non 
modo facere honestum sit, sed etiam non facere turpe, III 56). It is not clear 
why Cicero believes it would actually be wrong to be frank about the faults 
of what one is selling. Perhaps he thinks it is so foolish (quid vero est stult-
ius, III 55) to show so little regard for one’s legitimate interest that it would 
actually be wrong. This is still different from Plato’s case, where we positiv-
ely ought not to return the sword, because of the harm that would result to 
the owner and to others. 
Cicero does not simply offer his intuitive reaction to each of the cases of 
conscience that he presents. He also tries to connect them with Stoic moral 
principles. He often appeals to what nature and human society require. Is it 
reasonable to do this? Do we learn anything by trying to explain specific 
judgments by these very general principles? 
6 .  Seneca:  praecepta  and decreta  
Seneca tries to answer this question in his Epistle 95, where he considers 
the claim that practical ethics does not require moral theory15. The oppon-
ent argues in three steps: (1) The happy life consists in correct actions. 
(2) Precepts lead to correct actions. (3) Therefore precepts are sufficient 
for correct actions16. If this argument is sound, we need only precepts if we 
are to act correctly. These precepts may consist of prescriptions about par-
ticular cases (‘Give him back the knife you have borrowed’) or of prescript-
ions applying to a recognizable type of action (‘Give back what you have 
borrowed’ or ‘We ought to give back what we have borrowed’). Since we 
can find precepts of this sort without needing any philosophical doctrines, 
these doctrines seem to be unnecessary for correct actions. 
The Stoics reject both the premisses of this argument. The second pre-
miss is false, because, even if we have correct precepts, they do not result in 
a happy life unless we also have the right doctrines (decreta). The first pre-
miss is false, because correct action is only part of the best life. The oppon-
ents who argue against the relevance of doctrines have overlooked the dif-
ference between correct actions and actions done correctly (recte facta, 
katorthomata). According to the Stoics, a happy life consists not only in 
 
15. Seneca is helpfully discussed by Inwood 1999. 
16. ‘Beata’ inquiunt ‘vita constat ex actionibus rectis; ad actiones rectas praecepta 
perducunt; ergo ad beatam vitam praecepta sufficiunt’. (Seneca, Ep. 95.4.) 
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doing the right things, but also in doing them correctly. To do them cor-
rectly, we need philosophical doctrines: 
Philosophy, therefore, being theoretical, must have its doctrines. And why? 
Because no one can duly perform right actions except one who has been 
entrusted with reason, which will enable him, in all cases, to fulfil all the 
measures of duties. He cannot observe these measures unless he receives 
precepts for every occasion, and not for the present alone. Precepts by 
themselves are weak and, so to speak, rootless if they are assigned to the 
parts. It is the doctrines that will strengthen and support us in peace and 
calm, which will cover at the same time the whole of life and the whole 
nature of things. The difference between philosophical doctrines and prec-
epts is the same as between elements and members; the latter depend upon 
the former, while the former are the causes both of the latter and of all 
things. (95.12) 
He maintains that they are the foundation and root of correct precepts. 
Rootless precepts without doctrines do not offer us the practical guidance 
that we need. 
If we have only precepts that give us rules about specific types of action, 
we may not know how to extend them to unfamiliar cases. As Seneca says, 
we may grasp a precept ‘in rem’ but fail to grasp it ‘in omne’. 
Suppose that someone is doing what he should; he cannot keep it up 
continuously or consistently, since he will not know the reason for so act-
ing. Some things will turn out to be correct because of luck or practice; but 
he will have no rule to hand by which they may be regulated and in which 
he may be confident that the things he has done are correct. Someone who 
is good by chance will not promise to be good permanently. (39) 
Stoic doctrines guide our decisions because they tell us not to choose 
the accumulation of wealth, security, and comfort, over the demands of vir-
tue. If we would be inclined to deviate from the requirements of virtue in 
cases of greater difficulty or temptation, a grasp of the proper relation of 
virtue to indifferents will remove this inclination. 
We can use Stoic doctrines to decide unfamiliar or perplexing cases 
because these doctrines tell us what is morally relevant. The relevant consi-
derations are those that help or hinder the life in accordance with nature, 
which provides the objective (propositum) for virtuous action.  
Marcus Brutus, in the book which he has entitled On Duty gives many 
precepts to parents, children, and brothers; but no one carry out these pre-
cepts in the way he ought to unless he has something he can refer them to. 
We must present the goal of [i.e. consisting in] the highest good towards 
which we may strive, and to which all our acts and words may look towards 
 Terence Irwin   
 
122 
– just as sailors must guide their course by some star. A life without an obj-
ective is erratic. And if an objective is to be presented, doctrines begin to be 
necessary.  (45-6) 
The better we understand the life according to nature, the better our 
grasp of what to do in different kinds of cases. 
The appeal to nature is relevant, in Seneca as in Cicero, because human 
nature forms a system or whole, and the different precepts deal with parts. 
We might have a precept about keeping promises, but we ought not to 
keep them in all circumstances, as Plato makes clear. We decide this quest-
ion by recalling that people ought not to be given the means to satisfy their 
irrational suicidal impulses. We take this to be relevant because we have 
some idea of the interests that are to be served by the specific moral pre-
cepts we might accept – whether these are in particular (‘Give him the 
knife back now’) or general (‘Give back what you have promised to give 
back’). On a larger scale the same point applies to other precepts.  
I can pass on this short rule (formulam) of human duty: all this that you 
see, which includes both divine and human things, is one – we are the parts 
of a great body. Nature produced us related to one another, since she creat-
ed us from the same things and for the same things. She implanted mutual 
love in us, and made us suitable for society (sociabiles). She determined 
what is fair and just. Because of how she constituted us it is more wretched 
to harm than to be harmed. From her command, let our hands be ready for 
all who are to be helped. (51-2) 
And so a fuller conception of the life in accordance with nature tells us 
how they fit together and when one should take precedence over another. 
Even if we could always decide the right (honestum) thing to do, we 
could not do without Stoic doctrine, because we might sometimes be incl-
ined not to do what we believe to be right. Our commitment to precepts 
will be weakened if something out of the ordinary happens – if, for inst-
ance, it is more difficult or dangerous than usual to follow a precept, even 
though we recognize that it still applies to us. But Stoic doctrines maintain 
our confidence when we face such situations (securitatem nostrum tran-
quillitatemque tueantur, 92.12). They do this because they tell us that hap-
piness consists in being virtuous, so that we have no reason to deviate from 
what virtue requires for the sake of some other apparent benefit. We are 
free from anxiety, because we understand that the sources of our well-being 
are not endangered from circumstances beyond our control. 
Moreover, even if we perform all the right actions, we do not perform 
them for the right reason unless we have some grasp of what is right about 
them. 
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Furthermore, precepts will ensure that you do what must be done; but they 
will not ensure that you do it in the way it must be done; and if they do not 
ensure this, they do not lead you all the way to virtue. I grant that if 
someone is instructed, he will do what must be done. But that is a small 
matter, since the praise is not in what is done, but in the way it is done. (40) 
Since morality is not only about what we do, but also about why we do 
it, and about the character that underlies the action, we do not simply need 
some means to reach the right answers and some means to ensure that we 
act on the right answers, we also need access to the right reasons. Two peo-
ple might perform the same actions, but from different motives and differ-
ent traits of character. The right trait of character depends on the right 
reasons, and the right reasons come from Stoic doctrine. 
7 .  The precepts  of  natural  law 
If we try to apply Seneca’s principles to casuisitical questions, what will 
be the results? Among the examples one might offer in order to answer this 
question, it may be worthwhile to survey the acute discussion of principles 
and rules in Suarez’s treatment of the Decalogue17. In his view, the Deca-
logue is a series of divine commands that differ from other divine com-
mands in belonging to natural law. The precepts of natural law state requi-
rements of ‘intrinsic morality’; that is to say, they prescribe actions that are 
right in themselves, apart from whether anyone prescribes them. God's 
command and prohibition presuppose this intrinsic rightness18 and wrong-
ness in actions themselves19. 
Since Suarez speaks of the ‘prescriptions’ or ‘precepts’ (praecepta) of 
natural law, we may suppose that he has in mind the practical rules that 
Seneca calls ‘praecepta’. And indeed Suarez’s conception of a precept is 
similar to Seneca’s, in so far as both take a precept to be a prescription for 
guiding action. Suarez also agrees with Seneca’s view that precepts alone are 
insufficient without doctrines (Seneca’s decreta). But his view is more com-
plex than Seneca’s, because he believes that we do not even know the con-
tent of the relevant precepts without reference to doctrines. 
Suarez considers precepts of natural law such as ‘Do not kill’. In his 
view, we ought not to suppose that these are rules parallel to ‘A deposit 
must be returned’. Such rules have exceptions, and so, if precepts of natural 
law are to be understood in the same way, they have exceptions. Suarez, 
however, maintains that the precepts of natural law have no exceptions. 
We think they have exceptions only because we fail to distinguish the 
 
17. I have given a few more details on Suarez’s views in Irwin 2008, § 444-6. 
18. Suarez, De bonitate et malitia humanorum actuum, II 2.11 (= Opera, IV). 
19. Suarez, De legibus, II 6.11. 
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precepts themselves from the formulations that attempt to express the 
precepts. 
The law about returning a deposit, in so far as it is natural, is not judged in 
the mind so simply and unqualifiedly (absolute), but with limitation and 
circumspection; for reason dictates that a deposit is to be returned to one 
who asks for it lawfully (iure) and rationally, or <that it is to be returned> 
unless some reason of a just defence, a reason applying either to the com-
monwealth or to oneself, or to an innocent person, prevents it. Commonly, 
however, this law tends to be expressed only in these words: ‘A deposit is to 
be returned’. That is because the other things are implicitly understood, 
and cannot all be made clear in the form of law laid down in a human 
way20.  
‘Keep promises’ is an incomplete formulation of the relevant precept, 
because it does not contain all the qualifications that would be needed in 
an accurate formulation. Similarly, ‘Do not kill’, is an inadequate formulat-
ion of the precept about homicide. The relevant precepts contain the ne-
cessary qualifications, and so they have no exceptions. 
Suarez distinguishes the rules that have exceptions from the precepts of 
the natural law, because he takes the precepts of natural law to be correct 
precepts of practical reason about what is suitable to human nature. Cor-
rect precepts cannot allow exceptions; and hence ‘Keep promises’ cannot 
be an accurate formulation of a correct precept. Since the precepts of natur-
al law are prescriptions of correct reason, we know that they cannot be (in 
Stoic terms) a mere series of isolated practical rules (praecepta) with except-
ions, they include circumstances and conditions. Suarez supposes that we 
can rely on practical reason to show that unqualified rules do not capture 
the precepts of natural law. 
The appeal to practical reason is relevant because practical reason takes 
account of the systematic character of the precepts of natural law. Since 
natural law, taken as a whole, expresses what is intrinsically right and ap-
propriate for human nature, the different precepts do not express separate 
moral requirements; they express different aspects of the relevant sort of 
appropriateness. Reflexion on returning deposits and on other precepts of 
natural law shows us that we need to limit the circumstances for returning 
deposits. These limits introduce other precepts and virtues; we have to 
know whether someone is asking ‘lawfully’, and whether some ‘just de-
fence’ requires us to withhold the deposit. 
This is the point at which Suarez appeals to philosophical doctrines 
(Stoic decreta). His views about practical reason, human nature, and intrin-
sic morality tell us what a precept of natural law must say, and therefore tell 
 
20. Suarez, De legibus, II 13.6. 
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us why ‘Keep promises’ and ‘Do not kill’ are not accurate formulations of 
the relevant precepts, even though we may use them to refer to the corres-
ponding precepts. He goes beyond the claim that we cannot apply praecepta 
well without decreta. In his view, we cannot even find the right praecepta 
without relying on the philosophical doctrines underlying the theory of 
natural law. 
8 .  Casuis itcal  applicat ions:  ly ing  
This view of the precepts of natural law affects Suarez’s treatment of 
specific areas of moral perplexity. If we recognize that the requirements of 
natural law may be complex, we find them only by attention to cases that 
involve some complication. We may illustrate this point by a relatively sim-
ple example, taken from his discussion of lying and deception. 
He accepts the authority of Augustine, who takes the commandment 
against false witness to prohibit all lying (asserting what one believes to be 
false). But this absolute prohibition leaves many questions unanswered, 
since it does not explicitly cover equivocation and mental reservation. 
These are not instances of lying; or at least not obvious instances; for if I 
speak ambiguously or incompletely, I still assert, or at least mean to say, 
what I believe, though my audience does not take me to assert what I really 
assert.21 
If, for instance, I say in my halting French ‘Mes chevaux sont blancs’, 
because I have confused ‘chevaux’ and ‘cheveux’, I meant to say that my hair 
is white, even though I might be taken to say that my horses are white. Sim-
ilarly, if I am asked whether a remark was an insult, I might begin to reply 
‘It was a slight irritation, but not an insult’, but if I am interrupted after 
‘slight’, I will be taken to have said that it was a slight, and so to have said 
the opposite of what I intended. In this case I would have lied had I inten-
ded to assert that it was a slight, but I have not lied, since the audience did 
not hear all that I meant to say. 
Though these are blameless cases of misleading speech that fails to con-
vey what I mean to say, more difficult questions arise when I deliberately 
leave unexpressed part of what I mean to say. These are cases of mental 
reservation, in which I ‘hold back’ or ‘reserve’ part of what I mean to say, 
and do not utter it22. But when is this sort of reservation permissible or re-
quired? 
Suppose that Jones is considering whether to offer a job to Smith, and 
that Jones asks me about Smith, because I knew Smith in a previous job. 
Jones might ask me a number of questions, and end by asking ‘Do you 
 
21. Suarez, De iuramenti praeceptis, III 9.2 (= Opera, XIV). 
22. Mental reservation is explained by Davis 1946, II, 413. 
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know anything else about Smith?’ If I know facts about Smith that are 
irrelevant to Smith’s qualifications, I might say ‘Nothing’, where I mean 
‘Nothing relevant to Smith’s qualifications’. The extra words belong to my 
‘mental reservation’ (i.e. what I keep in my mind and do not utter). I did 
not lie to Jones by not giving irrelevant information. In this context, Suarez 
is right to suppose that mental reservation is legitimate. It was unnecessary 
to utter the reserved words, and might even have given the wrong impres-
sion (as though I were inviting questions on irrelevant matters). 
But now suppose that Jones wants to collect information on Smith’s 
private life, because Jones wants to find out something that will embarrass 
Smith. Jones’s question ‘Do you know anything more about Smith?’ is 
intended to elicit information that is not relevant to Smith’s qualifications. 
If I know about Jones’s designs, I know what the point of his question is. If 
I refuse to answer, or if I say that I know nothing more that is relevant to 
Smith’s qualification, I may create the impression that I am hiding some-
thing. And so I say ‘I know nothing’, with the mental reservation that I 
know nothing on any topic that he should be asking me about. The fact 
that Jones wants me to violate the appropriate expectations does not make 
my answer into a lie, since it is an appropriate answer given the appropriate 
expectations.  
This argument is intended to show not that elliptical utterances are 
always or usually permissible, but that they are sometimes permissible. 
Suarez’s permission for equivocation and reservation is carefully restricted. 
He recognizes that the mere avoidance of lies does not exhaust reasonable 
expectations about truth-telling. The facts about social life and communic-
ation that make it wrong to lie also make it wrong to speak deceptively or 
evasively without lying. We should try to make our speech convey what we 
mean to say, and we should not deliberately mislead our audience. Object-
ions to lying are often equally strong objections to misleading speech in 
which we mean to say what we believe. The use of equivocation and 
deliberate omission is wrong and contrary to the needs of human society, 
since it undermines the normal basis of communication23. Mental reservat-
ion, therefore, should be confined to cases in which the questioner has no 
right to a complete and unequivocal answer and some serious harm would 
result from such an answer. 
I have not tried to defend Suarez’s particular moral judgments, but to 
suggest how he understands the connexion between principles, rules, and 
particular cases. Neither the precepts of the Decalogue nor the rest of the 
natural law provides a series of rules without exceptions. They have to be 
understood in relation to each other. To understand them in relation to 
 
23. See Suarez, De iur. III 11.4 (= Opera, XIV). 
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each other we have to consider their implications in different sorts of situa-
tions where the relevant moral questions arise. To find the relevant im-
plications, Suarez relies on the connexion between morality, the needs of 
human nature, and the role of society in the human good. Reference to 
human nature and human society do not guarantee a correct answer in 
every case; but that is hardly an objection to them. They are abstract, but 
they are neither empty nor useless. They confirm Seneca’s view that philo-
sophical doctrines are useful, and indeed necessary, for finding reasonable 
solutions for difficult cases. On this point Suarez supports the Stoic view 
that moral philosophy is the right foundation for casuistry. 
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